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  In this paper we study the impact of a temporary lack of credibility in a 
transition to price stability. We quantify the effects of a period of disinflation 
on temporary output losses, and the impact of the lack of credibility on the 
optimal speed on disinflation. We demonstrate that the “disinflationary 
booms” found by Ball (1994) and Ireland (1997) may or may not disappear in 
an environment with imperfect credibility, depending on the speed of learning 
relative to the speed of disinflation. Finally we enquire whether the speed of the 
Volcker disinflation was excessive or not. 
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 1. Introduction
In this paper we study the eﬀects of a disinﬂationary monetary policy when
policy makers are committed to price stability in the strict sense of achieving and
maintaining a constant price-level. The analysis takes place in an environment
where the supply-side of the economy is characterized by monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms, and where there is rigidity in the setting of prices. Recent
research has revealed much about the eﬀe c t so fm o n e t a r yc o n t r a c t i o ni ns u c ha n
environment.
For our purpose, three broad results stand out from this work. First, in the
periods following a contraction in the money stock, real output is likely to fall
below its (now altered) long-run equilibrium level. Second, a gradual disinﬂation
may actually result in output, after its initial decline, rising above its new steady-
state level, and remaining so for some time. And ﬁnally, it is optimal to end
high inﬂations quickly, low inﬂations gradually, and maintain inﬂation at or near
zero, thereafter. The key papers that develop these results are due to Ball (1994),
Ireland (1997), King and Wollman (1999) and Khan, King and Wollman (2002).
Important precursors to the analytical foundations of these results are contained
in Danziger (1988), Benabou and Konieczny (1994) and Lucas and Stokey (1983),
while the contributions of Sargent (1982) and Gordon (1982), as emphasized by
Ireland, provide an important focus on policy implications of diﬀerential speeds
of disinﬂation.
The theoretical papers just mentioned, and many others besides, assume
perfect foresight (or rational expectations). For some purposes this assumption
is obviously appropriate: what other assumption makes sense when one wishes
to analyze an economic model in, or in a close neighborhood of, an unchanging
steady state? However, the assumption of perfect foresight may be less attractive
2when one wishes to analyze the eﬀects of ‘large’ changes in policy. For one thing,
the steady state of the model may well be changing. In addition, policymakers
may not enjoy complete credibility. In this paper we examine the eﬀects of a
disinﬂationary monetary policy when policymakers initially do not enjoy complete
credibility, and where the steady state of the economy is changing. We model the
monetary policymakers as doggedly pursuing the goal of price stability in the face
of this imperfect, but improving, credibility.
Two important recent contributions address some of the issues we do. The
ﬁrst is Ball (1995). He demonstrates that if credibility is suﬃciently low, a period
of disinﬂation may lead to expected output losses. In his model agents harbour
a nagging suspicion that the authorities will renege and give up on the path of
disinﬂation. He models agents’ scepticism as a constant conditional probability of
reneging. This may be a somewhat rigid way of modelling the evolution of agents’
priors. On the one hand, as the disinﬂation proceeds it is plausible that agents
accord increasing weight to the announced path for the money supply. On the
other hand, perhaps as the disinﬂation proceeds and the extent of nominal rigidity
in the economy optimally rises, the authorities may be more likely to renege (to
exploit a ﬂattening of the Phillips curve). Ex ante both of these cases seem
intuitively plausible, and so we propose an ‘expectations updating rule’ that nests
these alternatives. The distinction between these two cases can be important, as
we demonstrate below. In addition, Ball (1995) leaves to one side the issue of the
optimal speed of disinﬂation under imperfect credibility, a topic we take up here.
The second related paper is by Ireland (1995). He also ﬁnds that higher
output losses are the price of imperfect credibility during a period of disinﬂation.
However, the attainment of price stability is desirable (i.e., welfare enhancing) in
general, except when the loss of seigniorage is replaced in the low inﬂation state
by a rise in other distortionary taxes. Again, his modelling of the expectations
3formation process misses the eﬀects to which we have just referred. In addition,
we examine the issue of a lack of credibility in a more complex, but now standard,
supply-side with a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers. This
set up leads to some computational complexities related to the optimal choice of
prices by ﬁrms who not only have to forecast future demand and cost conditions,
but also have to forecast their covariances. This may be why these other authors
employ somewhat simpler supply-sides in their set-ups. We also extend Ireland’s
(1997) calculation of the optimal speed of disinﬂation to the case of imperfect
credibility, and enquire whether or not imperfect credibility materially impacts
on the optimal speed of disinﬂation, as compared to the situation under perfect
foresight. This is a question of ﬁrst-order policy importance but which, to our
knowledge, has not been addressed hitherto in the class of models employed here,
and which is proving popular for policy-oriented analyses.
1.1. Outline of the Paper
In the next section we outline our model and discuss its salient features. In
section 3 we display some benchmark results that demonstrate the three key
points we mentioned above. In section 4 we propose our expectations updating
rule. In section 5 we analyze the impact of imperfect credibility during a period
of disinﬂation. In section 6 we use our model to analyse the Volcker disinﬂation.
Given the actual course of disinﬂation during this period, we back out the implied
speed of learning of agents in the economy (by matching the output gap of our
model to a measure of the actual US output gap during this period). Given the
implied speed of learning, we then compare the speed of the Volcker disinﬂation
with the optimal speed of disinﬂation. In Section 7 we discuss our results and
oﬀer some thoughts on areas for future research.
42. The Model
2.1. The Representative Agent
Our basic framework extends the perfect foresight model of Ireland (1997).
Its component parts are now familiar in the literature and so we can develop
the key equations somewhat briskly. The economy consist of many identical
consumers. Each period a representative agent makes plans for consumption
and leisure/labour such that (expected) present discounted value of utility is













α,γ > 0, (2.1)
and is separable in consumption, Ct, and labour supply, Nt. β ∈ (0,1) is a discount











where ct(i) denotes, in equilibrium, the number of units of each good i from ﬁrm i
that the representative agent consumes. b is the price elasticity of demand. pt(i)
is the nominal price at which ﬁrm i must sell output on demand during time t.














5where nt(i) denotes the quantity of labour supplied by the household to each ﬁrm
i, at the nominal wage Wt, during each period. This assumption means that
households eﬀectively supply a portion of labour to all ﬁrms. The reason why we
need such an assumption (and the one below regarding the representative agent’s
share portfolio) is to ensure that the marginal utility of wealth equalizes across
agents.




[Qt (i)st−1 (i)+Φt (i)+Wtnt (i)]di ≥
Z 1
0
[pt (i)ct (i)+Qt (i)st (i)]di. (2.4)
Here Qt (i) denotes the nominal price of a share in ﬁrm i, st denotes the quantity
of shares, Φt (i)di = Dt(i)st(i),w h e r eDt(i) is the dividend associated with a unit
share, and
R 1
0 pt (i)ct (i)di = PtCt denotes total nominal expenditure. We assume
that for t =0 ,s −1(i)=1 , for all i ∈ [0,1]. In eﬀect, then, we are assuming that
each household owns an equal share of all the ﬁrms. The constraint (2.4) says
that each period (and, under uncertainty, in each state of nature) income (ﬁnancial
plus labour) can be worth no less then the value of expenditure (on non-durable
consumption plus ﬁnancial investment). The household problem, then, is to choose
ct(i),n t(i),s t(i) and total consumption, Ct, such as to maximize (2.1) subject
to the sequence of constraints (2.4), and the relevant initial and transversality
conditions. Optimal household behaviour is described by the requirement that
household consumption spending must be optimally allocated across diﬀerentiated
goods at each point in time (i.e., the optimal ct(i)). It can be shown that the







As in Ireland (1997) it will simplify things somewhat if we let aggregate nominal




Pt (i)ct (i)di = PtCt. (2.6)
An interior optimum for the agent’s problem will include (2.4) with equality, (2.5)
for all i, (2.6) and the following conditions:
C
−α
t = λtPt; (2.7)
γ = λtWt. (2.8)
And for all i
Qt(i)=Dt(i)+βEt(λt+1/λt)Qt+1(i), (2.9)
where λt is an unknown multiplier associated with (2.4).
2.2. The Corporate Sector
There is a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by i over the unit interval, each of them
producing a diﬀerent, perishable consumption good. So, goods may also be
indexed by i ∈ [0,1],w h e r eﬁrm i produces good i.
Each ﬁrm i sells shares, at the beginning of each period t, at the nominal
price Qt(i), and pays, at the end of the period, the nominal dividend Dt(i).T h e
representative household trades the number of shares that it owns, st(i),i ne a c ho f
the ﬁr m sa tt h ee n do fe a c hp e r i o dt. Under market clearing, st(i)=1 ,∀i ∈ [0,1],
in each period. Firms are able to change prices each period, subject to a ﬁxed
cost. As a consequence, in equilibrium ﬁrms will not necessarily be willing to
change prices in each period. The criterion for the price-setting decision at time
t is to maximise the return to shareholders.
7At time t we assume that ﬁrms are divided into two categories, such that
ﬁrms from the ﬁrst category can freely change their prices, p1,t(i), while the ﬁrms
belonging to the second must sell output at the same price set a period before,
p2,t(i)=p2,t−1(i), unless they pay the ﬁxed cost k>0, measured in terms of
labour. We may think of this cost as being associated with information collection
and decision making. At time t+1, the roles are reversed and the ﬁrst set of ﬁrms
keep prices unchanged, p1,t+1(i)=p1,t(i) unless they are willing to pay the ﬁxed
cost k, while the second set of ﬁrms can freely set new prices.
The model assumes, then, that ﬁrms are constantly re-evaluating their pricing
strategy, weighing the beneﬁts of holding prices ﬁxed versus the alternative of
changing prices and incurring the ﬁxed penalty. However at moment t the ﬁrms
be l o n g i n gt ot h es e to fﬁrms that can freely change price are able to choose between
two strategies, depending on whether the inﬂation rate is moderate or high. At
moderate rates of inﬂation, or in the face of gradual changes in the monetary
stance, they are more likely to keep their prices constant for two periods and
hence avoid the cost k (single price strategy). On the other hand, in the case of
ah i g hi n ﬂation, or in the face of sharp changes in the monetary stance, ﬁrms are
more likely to choose a new price and pay the cost k (two price strategy).
We assume a simple linear production technology yt(i)=lt(i),w h e r eyt(i) and
lt(i) a r eo u t p u to fﬁrm i and the labour used to produce it, respectively. Let us
denote aggregate output as Yt, then equilibrium proﬁts at time t for ﬁrm i are
given by,





Ct − It(i)Wt(i)k. (2.10)
While, in equilibrium, the units of labour supplied to each ﬁrm at nominal wage












1, if the ﬁrm pays the cost of price adjustment k at moment t;
0, if the ﬁrm does not pays the cost k at moment t.
2.3. Single price strategy
Under this strategy we may think of ﬁrm i choosing pt(i) so as to maximize the
following expression:
Πt(i)=Dt(i)+βEt (λt+1/λt)Dt+1(i), (2.11)
which follows from (2.9), and implies that prices are set to maximize market value.
We then set γ =1 , substitute (2.7), (2.8), the quantity equation and goods market
equilibrium into (2.10). It then follows that the price for ﬁrm i that will be used





















This equation is familiar from the New Keynesian economics. It basically says that
the optimal price will be a function of current and future anticipated demand and
costs conditions, and where in steady state price will be a ﬁxed mark-up over
marginal costs. As is familiar in models of monopolistic competition based on
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the markup is constant and determined by the elasticity
of demand (that is, tied down via the preference side of the model), the lower the
elasticity, the higher the mark-up.
92.4. Two price strategy
In this case the ﬁrm chooses the price pt(i) to maximise proﬁts in each period
Πt(i)=Dt(i). (2.13)









Here we see that prices are a mark-up as before; now it is only current period
demand and cost conditions that are relevant.
3. Model Calibration and Benchmark Results Under
Perfect Foresight
The calibration of the model follows Ireland (1997). We set α =0 .1 so that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution follows Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988).
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) b =6 , corresponding to a benchmark
value of 1.2 for the steady-state markup. Following Ball and Mankiw (1994), each
interval of time in the model corresponds to a period of six months, determining
the choice of β =0 .97, consistent with an annual discount rate of 5 percent. k, the
inﬂation rate at which the rigidity of individual goods prices vanishes, (i.e., ﬁrms
s w i t c hf r o mt h es i n g l ep r i c es t r a t e g yt ot h et w op r i c es t r a t e g y )i ss e ta t0 . 1 0 7 5 .
Finally, we assume γ =1 .
We study the eﬀect of a monetary policy that brings money growth to zero over
some horizon. This was the approach adopted in Ireland (1997), following Ball
(1994). Speciﬁcally, at period 0, the authorities make a surprise announcement





s=0 , such that by time period T
inﬂation will be zero. The superscript A indicates the ‘announced’ level of the
10money supply. This announced path for the money supply, in turn, implies a
gradual decrease in the growth rate of the money supply. Let θt denote the growth
rate of the money stock at time t. We study, then, processes for the money growth
rate of the following sort:




for any value of t from 0 to T −1,where θ−1 is equal to the initial rate of inﬂation,
and where θt>T =1 . So, a horizon of time T =1entails immediate disinﬂation,
while for T>1 the policymakers engineer a more gradual path towards price
stability.
Figure 3.1 shows the eﬀect of an immediate disinﬂation on output when the
initial inﬂation rate is 3% (the dashed line) and when the initial rate is 200%
(the solid line, which is coincident with the x-axis). We see that at relatively
low rates of inﬂation, this is quite costly as ﬁrms follow a single-price strategy.
The ‘hump-shaped’ response is due to the fact that the ﬁrst set of ﬁrms to set
new prices increase their price; past inﬂation has eroded their relative real price
and now they face a relatively large increase in demand for their products (since
the ﬁrms that don’t re-price have relatively high prices and hence relatively low
demand). At higher rates of initial inﬂation, ﬁr m sr e - p r i c ee v e r yp e r i o d( t w o - p r i c e
strategy) and hence disinﬂation can proceed with no relative-price distortion.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the eﬀects of a gradual disinﬂa t i o nf r o m3 %a n d
200% respectively. After the initial drop in output, a gradual disinﬂation leads
to a boom in output—a relatively prolonged period of above steady state output.
Agents set prices for two periods, and because inﬂation will be lower in the future,
they set lower prices today, causing a boom. At high initial rates of inﬂation, the
loss in output in the initial periods can be substantial. The problem is that with
gradual disinﬂation from high rates of inﬂation, ﬁrms do not initially change their
prices.










































Annual Inflation Rate 3%
Annual Inflation Rate 200%
Figure 3.1:
Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Perfect Foresight. 








































12Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Perfect Foresight. 







































Finally, ﬁgure 3.4 shows the optimal speed of disinﬂation for initial inﬂation
rates of between 1% and 20%. From various initial levels of inﬂation we calculate
the level utility associated with diﬀerent speeds of disinﬂation. During big
inﬂations ﬁrms are more likely to follow a two price strategy and hence under
perfect foresight disinﬂation is costless. On the other hand, at relatively low
rates ﬁrms are more likely to follow a single-price strategy and rapid disinﬂation
is more likely to be costly. It turns out that the optimal equilibrium strategy
for each initial inﬂation reported is the single price strategy (although two price
strategies were employed along a number of sub-optimal disinﬂation paths). At
very high rates of inﬂation (not reported) the two price strategy is optimal. We
return to what determines the optimal speed of disinﬂation below.

















In this section we consider what might happen when credibility is imperfect, but
nevertheless improving through time. We run variants of the above experiments
in an environment where the probability mass characterising agents’ subjective
expectations is shifting through time onto the central bank’s announced money
supply path. Introducing uncertainty into our framework results in some
computational complexity which an appendix discusses1. Again the policy
employed is to lower money growth linearly to zero over some time horizon, T ≥ 1.
To retain computational manageability, we assume that agents perceive of only
two possible outcomes. One outcome is the monetary authority’s announced path
for the money supply. The other outcome is a reversion to an alternative, more
inﬂationary, path for the money supply. There are two obvious choices for this
1This appendix is available on Nolan’s website:
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cn14/home.htm
14alternative path: First, agents perceive the authorities as reverting to the previous
steady state inﬂation rate. Second, alternatively, they fear the government will
‘run out of steam’ such that at time t (for 0 <t<T ) t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h e
money stock will be equal to the growth rate between t − 1 and t. Algebraically,
we can characterize these alternate expectations as follows:
Et+j−1Mt+j = ρt+jθ−1Mt+j−1 +( 1− ρt+j)M
A
t+j; (4.1)
Et+j−1Mt+j = ρt+jθt−1Mt+j−1 +( 1− ρt+j)M
A
t+j. (4.2)
We will assume that the authorities stick to the announced path of disinﬂation,
so in practice (4.1) and (4.2) may be rewritten as
Et+j−1Mt+j = ρt+jθ−1M
A










s=0 we need to decide on ρ0, a measure of the initial level of
credibility, the time it takes until ρT+J =0 ,f o rJ ≥ 0,a n dt h ep a t ho fρs in the
transition between these extrema. One option is simply to let ρs converge linearly
to zero in the following way:
ρt = ρt−1 − α
ρ0
N
t ≥ 1, (4.3)
where N is the period of the disinﬂation (measured in half-years) and α ∈ (0,1).
α captures the time it takes for agents to believe completely the central bank’s
announcements—i.e., for a perfect foresight equilibrium to obtain. However, there
may be more plausible characterizations2. The following function is useful for
capturing such paths:
2This linear path for ρ leads to results intermediate between those which we label below as
‘concave’ and ‘convex’. The results showing this are available on request.
15ρt =( −1)
δ k(a
2 − (t − δa)
2)
1
2 + δρ0, (4.4)



















Given ρ0, (4.5) plots the path {ρs}
T
s=0 as a concave function. This captures
the intuitive idea that agents may be reluctant to update their priors initially.
However, as time goes by and the central bank sticks to its announced money
supply targets, they increasingly come to believe the announced target path. We
shall refer to this case as concave (expectations) updating4. On the other hand,
(4.6) reﬂects a population, although happy to accept that the monetary authority
dislikes the current relatively high rate of inﬂation, nevertheless worries that as
the slope of the short-run Phillips curve ﬂattens the monetary authority may be
tempted to renege. The importance of the exploitability of the Phillips curve has
been emphasized by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) and is a crucial factor in
high inﬂation equilibria in games of the Barro and Gordon (1983) sort.5 We refer
to this as convex (expectations) updating.
3It can be shown that a = N and k = N/ρ0.
4That is, ρ plots as a concave function of time on the x−y plane, where the x−axis measures
time.
5Intermediate cases are possible to imagine, such as a truncated bell-shaped path for ρ.
This would capture a situation in which agents initially place little weight on the authority’s
announcements, as in (4.5). However, after some time (characterised by an inﬂe x i o ni nt h ep a t h
of ρ), agents once again become more sceptical, as in (4.6). We ignore these alternate paths.
16We still have two diﬃcult questions to answer. First, what is a reasonable
value for ρ0,a n da tw h a tp o i n tT do we have that ρs≥T =0 ,∀s; how credible is
the authority’s announcement at date zero, and how long does it take for agents
to ‘arrive’ at perfect foresight? We know of no studies that we can easily draw on
to parameterize functions (4.5) and (4.6), so our approach has been to analyze the
outcome of various thought experiments under many diﬀerent parameterizations
and to present the results we believe to be robust. For now we assume that
ρ0 =1 ,6 and that ρT =0after three years7. In Section 6 we shall attempt to
parameterize our learning rules using the experience of the US in the early 1980s.
5. The Eﬀect of Imperfect Credibility
5.1. Concave Expectations Updating Under (4.1)
In all of the charts that follow the dashed line is the perfect foresight case, and
the solid line is the imperfect credibility case. Figure 5.1 compares the path of
output under perfect foresight and concave expectations updating, given an initial
inﬂation rate of 3%.
The contraction in output is more pronounced and more protracted under
imperfect credibility. And even though by period 6 agents in both economies have
the same information, the eﬀects of imperfect credibility remain for some time
due to the overlapping nature of price setting.
One of the potentially counterfactual implications of the perfect foresight case,
as emphasized by Ball (1994, 1995), is the implication of the ‘disinﬂationary
boom’: i.e., the tendency for output to rise above its new steady state level under
6We experimented with a number of diﬀerent initial values for ρ0. The results were virtually
unchanged for values of ρ0 as low as 0.5.
7If ρ takes a longer time to reach zero, output obviously also takes a longer time to
reach its new steady state level. Our assumption implies agents ﬁnally believe completely the
anouncement when, and only when, price stability is actually achieved.
17Output Effects of Immediate Disinflation under Concave Learning. 








































ag r a d u a ld i s i n ﬂation as agents anticipate lower future price-levels.
Figure 5.2 shows that under concave updating this eﬀect may vanish as output
falls more sharply and does not rise above its new steady state value along the
transition path. Agents only gradually come to realise that the price-level is
to grow at a zero rate—a realization that is all the more tardy because of the
gradualness of the disinﬂationary process itself. For very high initial inﬂation
rates, the fall in output following an immediate disinﬂation is catastrophic as
ﬁgure 5.3 demonstrates and it is also of a similar order of magnitude under a
more gradual disinﬂation, as ﬁgure 5.4 shows.
Given the extra cost imposed by imperfect credibility, what is the quantitative
impact on the optimal speed of disinﬂation? Figure 5.5 reveals that a good ‘rule-
of-thumb’ is that disinﬂations from initial rates between 2%-11% should take an
extra year, as compared with the perfect foresight case. In contrast for inﬂation
rates above 12% and less than or equal to 1% the optimal speed of disinﬂation is
18Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation over 3 Years under Concave Learning. 













































Output Effects of Immediate Disinflation under Concave Learning. 










































19Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Concave Learning. 











































indistinguishable from the perfect foresight case.
The key reason that gradual disinﬂa t i o n sa r ea t t r a c t i v ei st h a t ,w i t hs o m e
price stickiness and under perfect foresight, they often imply prolonged periods
of above trend output and consumption. However, as the initial inﬂation rate
rises the contraction in output in the early periods of the disinﬂation is more
pronounced, increasingly oﬀsetting the utility gain from the subsequent boom—
the optimal speed of disinﬂation rises.
Under imperfect credibility, the initial contraction in output is more severe for
any initial inﬂation rate than is the case under perfect foresight. Furthermore,
the utility gain from the disinﬂationary boom may be absent. It turns out that
a more gradual period of disinﬂation is optimal up until an initial inﬂation rate
of around 12%. For initial inﬂation rates greater than 12% the optimal speed of
disinﬂation is the same as under perfect foresight.
In short, therefore, under perfect foresight gradual disinﬂations are primarily


















about reaping the utility from output gains following an initial contraction in
activity, while under imperfect credibility a primary concern is avoiding over-
sharp contractions in activity in the early period of the disinﬂation.
21Output Effects of Immediate Disinflation under Convex Learning. 














































5.2. Convex Expectations Updating Under (4.1)
Many of the same qualitative results found under concave updating are present
with convex updating. However, as is apparent from Figures 5.6-5.9, the outturns
look closer to the case of perfect foresight compared with concave updating. The
reason for this is that the convex path of ρ means that agents avoid some of the
more costly mistakes early on in the disinﬂation that may occur under concave
updating.
Figure 5.6 shows that the drop in output under immediate disinﬂation leads
to a drop in output more severe than, but close to, that under perfect foresight.
This tendency for agents to believe the authorities when they announce
decreases in the rate of growth of money also permits disinﬂationary booms to
occur, as ﬁgure 5.7 shows, for ‘moderate’ rates of inﬂa t i o nw h i l s ts u c hb o o m sa r e
absent for higher initial rates of inﬂation, as ﬁgure 5.8 demonstrates.
The optimal speed of disinﬂation, ﬁgure 5.9, is closer to the case of perfect
22Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Covex Learning. 










































foresight than under concave expectations updating.
5.3. Concave and Convex Expectations Updating Under (4.2)
Under (4.2) agents expect the disinﬂation policy to stall such that there is some
probability that next period’s inﬂation will equal this period’s. We found that
because the initial expectational errors are smaller than under (4.1), the results
tend to be closer to those found under perfect foresight; deﬂationary booms are
more likely to occur under (4.2). As before, concave updating tends to make these
booms disappear,8although this is now less likely to occur than under (4.1). For
example, Figure 5.10 compares the eﬀects of gradual disinﬂation under perfect
foresight (dashed line) with concave learning under (4.1), the bottom line; and
with concave learning under (4.2), the middle line.
8We do not present the results in detail, but they are, in chart form, available upon request.
23Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Convex Learning. 



























































24Output Effects of Gradual Disinflation under Concave Learning. 














































6. The Volcker Disinﬂation and the Optimal Speed of
Disinﬂation9
In sections 4 and 5 we adopted a number of diﬀerent expectations updating rules.
In this section we attempt to use the experience of the US in the early 1980s to
look at, for this period at least, what might be an empirically plausible version of
the expectations updating rule.
Between late 1979 and 1985 inﬂation in the US fell, broadly speaking, from
10% to 4%, and has subsequently fallen further. This reduction in the inﬂation
rate was costly, as measures of the output gap from this period indicate. In this
section, we take a ﬁrst pass at the issue: might the Volcker disinﬂation have been
too rapid? To do this we assume that the initial steady state inﬂation was 10%
(around the highest level that actual US inﬂation reached before coming down),
9We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the analysis that we undertake
in this section.
25and that Volcker intended to reduce inﬂation to 2% (close to the average inﬂation
rate since 1984). We use the currency component of M1 from 1979 until 1984
as the path for the money stock during the disinﬂation. Given this path and
assuming perfect foresight we calculate the ﬂexible price level of output of our
model. We then back out a learning process such that the output gap in our
model tracks the actual US output gap. Given that learning process we can then
calculate the optimal speed of disinﬂation.
T h ed a s h e dl i n ei nﬁgure 6.1 is the US output gap as measured by the OECD.
The solid line is the output gap of our model. To generate such a sharp contraction
in output we had to adopt a somewhat extreme form of concave learning, where
agents to not believe the ‘announced’ money supply growth rates for almost the
whole course of the disinﬂa t i o n(5y e a r s ) ,a n dt h e ni nt h ec o u r s eo fy e a rs i x ,
believe entirely the announced path. And even then we cannot quite generate the
sharpness of the contraction indicated in the OECD data; although both measures
of the output gap bottom out in 1982, the model ouput gap at the trough is 1%
less than the OECD estimate.
The optimal speed of disinﬂa t i o nf r o ma ni n i t i a lr a t eo fi n ﬂation of 10% to
2% under perfect foresight is three and half years. In contrast the optimal speed
under the learning process implied above is seven years. Our calculations suggest
that even had the disinﬂation taken longer than it actually did the output losses
would have been only marginally lower.
C l e a r l yo n en e e d st ob ec a u t i o u si na ne x e r c i s es u c ha st h i sa sw ea r es q u e e z i n g
r e a lw o r l dd a t ai n t oah i g h l ys i m p l i ﬁed framework, but we think these results
are indicative. It appears that once inﬂation has risen substantially, imperfect
credibility makes sizeable output losses in the transition to price stability highly
likely, even when the speed of disinﬂa t i o ni s‘ o p t i m a l ’ . I nar e l a t e da n a l y s i s
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Volcker disinﬂation under the assumption that agents use optimal ﬁltering to
disentangle persistent changes in the inﬂation target from temporary shocks to
the monetary policy rule. Unlike in the current set up, in their model the steady
state is unchanged throughout this period. However, leaving aside this important
diﬀerence10,t h e ya l s oﬁnd as we do that sizeable output losses may be the price
of imperfect credibility.
10The diﬀerence may be important for the sorts of reasons discussed in Albanesi, Chari and
Christiano (2003).
277. Discussion and Conclusions
We think two results stand out from our investigation. First, we ﬁnd that
imperfect credibility and price stickiness are jointly neither necessary nor suﬃcient
for monetary contractions to cause lengthy recessions, at least for the relatively
modest initial levels of inﬂation under scrutiny here. In this sense our results
conﬂict with Ball (1995).
Second, in our model imperfect credibility need not be an overriding concern to
the policymaker initiating a period of disinﬂation; under imperfect credibility the
optimal speed of disinﬂation is quite similar to the case of perfect foresight. That
said, under concave expectations updating initially sharp falls in output were a
concern for the policymaker. Under convex updating, and perfect foresight, the
optimal speed of disinﬂation was driven to a large extent by the protracted period
of above steady state output.
What is central to both of these results is the size of the expectational errors
early on the regime shift relative to the degree of price stickiness. For a given
level of imperfect credibility longer nominal contract length will generally imply
sharper recessions following a monetary contraction. Under convex updating these
initial errors are relatively small while under concave updating they are somewhat
larger.
Future research might investigate three issues. First, how large does the initial
fall in output have to be before it is optimal for the policymaker to renege on the
announcement to attain price stability. We accommodated this issue by focussing
on situations where the initial rate of inﬂation was relatively modest. For countries
with very high initial inﬂation rates, however, reneging might well be optimal, as
Figure 5.3 strongly suggests.
A second issue concerns the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy.
28We side-stepped this issue altogether by ignoring distortionary taxation of real
activity. Again, so long as initial inﬂation, and hence seigniorage, is relatively
modest the ﬁscal implications of disinﬂation are probably limited. As initial
inﬂation rises, the public sector budget constraint is likely to play an increasing
role in the welfare calculus.
A ﬁnal issue concerns how quickly agents actually take to learn about regime
shifts. In this paper we picked what we thought were sensible scenarios. In
truth, we know relatively little about such issues, although in section 6 we make
a tentative ﬁrst step in this direction as do Erceg and Levin (2003). Given its
importance to our results, this is an important topic for future research.
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318. Appendix: Solving the model
In this appendix we set out our approach to solving the model. We do this in two
steps. The ﬁrst step entails mapping the non-linear stochastic problem into a form
more convenient to work with numerically. The second step then constructs the
equilibrium solution to that simpler problem. The solution to the model under
perfect foresight requires only the second of these steps and hence we do not spell
this out in detail.
8.1. Step 1
In what follows let xt denote the vector of endogenous variables excluding
the control variables; st denotes the vector of control variables; θ denotes the
parameters of the model; Et(y|Ω) denotes the expectation of y conditional on the
information set Ω at time t. We need to solve a stochastic non-linear expectations
model of the following general form:
fEt (xt+1,x t,s t+1,s t;θ|Ω)=0 , (8.1)
where f : Rdx+dx × Rds+ds × Rdθ → Rdx is the equilibrium function, and dx, and
ds are the dimensionalities of the x, s,a n dθ spaces respectively. In what follows
we shall generally denote the conditional expectation using the shorthand, Et(y).
The expectation operator is given by a discrete distribution that takes on value





In the current set up k =1 . So applying (8.2), the expected money supply is
calculated as follows:




w h e r et h ew e i g h t sr e ﬂect agents’ perceptions as to the likelihood of the possible
outturns: w0 = ρ0 is the probability that money supply (z0(Mt)=θ−1Mt)
will revert to its previous steady state growth rate, while with probability





,ρ t ∈ [0,1],t=0 ,1,2,... The path of ρt through time is
determined by (4.4) in the main text. This means that we may re-write equation
(8.1) as follows:
f (Et [xt+1],x t,E t [st+1],s t,Z t+1;θ)=0 ,
where Zt+1 ∈ Rdx is the expectation variable Zt+1 given by:
Zt+1 = Et [h(xt+1,s t+1)], (8.3)







































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a t
E [XY]=E [X]E [Y ]+cov (X,Y).





















































































,where wj, are probabilities associated to the distribution
function zj : Rn → Rn which in this case is the identity function, for all j = 0,1.




























In order to solve (8.6), we apply an iterative Jacobi method. For the case of
perfect foresight, the expectations variables are redundant as are the covariance
terms; otherwise the solution algorithm is identical across the problems. Starting
from an initial guess E [xt+1]
0 = x , each iteration q,q = 1,Q generates a new
vector of values E [xt+1]





q − E [xit+1]
q−1¯ ¯ <ε ,
where i = 1,202 is the index of an element in the vector E [xt+1] and ε is
chosen precision. The initial guess is given by the previous steady state for
34all the variables except the covariance term. To ﬁnd cov[st+1,x t+1] the model
is ﬁrst solved assuming that there is no correlation between the control and
endogenous variables st and xt. We do this under the assumption of perfect
foresight (corresponding to w0 =0and w1 =1 )and then assuming a complete
lack of credibility (w0 =1and w1 =0 ) . Given this information we may construct





is calculated as described in step 1 given that at the ﬁrst iteration , z0(xa
t) obtained
under the ﬁrst assumption and z1(xa
t+1) under the second one.
After the settings for the initial point are realized, the iterative process starts



































During this process, at each new iteration, we ﬁnd the proﬁt maximising price
and calculate the new covariance terms, based on the outcome from the previous
iteration.
The scalar φ ∈ (0,1) is a relaxation parameter which reduces the change
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